Beyond the global financial crisis: central banking in a new global financial system by Turhan, Ibrahim M.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Beyond the global financial crisis: central
banking in a new global financial system
Ibrahim M. Turhan
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Middle East Economic
Association
24 June 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31209/
MPRA Paper No. 31209, posted 31 May 2011 13:07 UTC
Central Bank of the Republic Of Turkey
9th International Conference of Middle East
Economic Association
Beyond the Global F
New G
 
Dr. M. İbrahim Turhan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
inancial Crisis: Central Banking in 
lobal Financial System 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Governor 
 
 
 
 
June 24, 2010 
Istanbul 
 
a 
 1
The Current Global Financial Crisis 
 
Since the outbreak of the global crisis in mid 2007, there has 
been an extensive discussion on root causes. Some blame the 
greed and corruption of financial actors. Others put the blame 
on central bankers for easy money or regulators who remained 
idle as too much risks accumulated in financial markets. 
According to advanced economies, global imbalances have been 
caused by emerging surplus countries that keep their currency 
undervalued and their domestic consumption restricted. Surplus 
countries, on the other hand, held deficit countries responsible 
for imprudent and reckless overspending.  
 
It is unfortunate that all these arguments and counter 
arguments, which may be valid in their own way, prevents a 
more general discussion on the deep-seated conflicts and 
contradictions in the global economic, social and political 
paradigm upon which the world order is built. To put it another 
way, the problems we face today do not arise from some 
operational failures, but from the system itself and the 
underlying philosophical framework.  
 
To have a better understanding, we should start reviewing the 
theoretical foundations of the existing financial architecture. 
Rational expectations theory suggests that expectations about 
the future reflect the entire cumulative knowledge available. 
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The inaccuracies in expectations should be coincidental, not 
systemic. Otherwise, this information would already be included 
in the pricing decisions. However, the history of financial crisis 
is nothing but the history of adaptive expectations and 
irrational exuberance which result in over-inflated asset prices. 
Think of the Tulip-mania of the Netherlands in the 17th century; 
British South Sea Company and French Mississippi bubbles in 
the 18th century, the “Buying now and paying later” attitude 
prior to the Great Depression, the internet boom and the “New 
Technological Age” of the late 1990s, and more recently the 
financial innovations prior to the crisis that presumably made 
risk disappear from balance sheets. Research shows that there 
is almost perfect and one-to-one relationship between asset 
bubbles and rapid credit expansion, but yet asset bubbles form 
systematically over and over gain any way. Aggregate demand 
shocks and involuntary unemployment have also been observed 
during crises, both of which are the anathema of main stream 
freshwater economics. 
 
Recent developments have brought significant and radical 
paradigm shift defying conventional rules. The conventional 
paradigm before the crisis assumed that markets always clear 
and therefore there is no need for exogenous correction and 
hence less is the best as regulation is concerned. Deregulation 
process that gained pace during the last quarter of 20th 
century has augmented the role of pricing mechanism in the 
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equilibration of the markets. But this mechanism is proven to 
be far from sufficient to facilitate an efficient decision-making 
process that maintains the trade-off between long-term tail 
risks and short-term financial gains. This situation spurred 
myopic behavior of the overconfident market players, and 
immediate gains were preferred over the collapse of the 
financial system in the long term. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
policy makers in the US and Europe have gone through a 
radical transformation and become in favor of quite 
comprehensive and intrusive regulations, ranging from 
Volcker’s rule that advocates a complete separation between 
retail banking and investment banking, to central clearing for 
over the counter derivatives and furthermore to financial levies. 
Some EU countries put measures to regulate trading in 
sovereign credit default swaps and short selling. The problems 
in EU regarding the sovereign debt are blamed on financial 
markets which were described as pack of wolves by some EU 
officials. Since the breakout of the Greek crisis, the authorities 
have been conducting a witch-hunt against speculators, who 
once assumed as untouchable because of their critical role in 
complete markets. 
 
We have witnessed a similar shift in other issues such as 
accounting standards and rating agencies. As you may recall 
before the crisis, the accounting standards were based on “fair 
value” models and rating agencies were incorporated in the 
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BASEL 2 framework, under the assumption that the invisible 
hand of markets would provide the perfect guidance. It turned 
out that fair value models inflated the financial bubbles in good 
times and contribute to the vicious cycle in bad times. It is no 
surprising that IFAS is now advocating the adoption of 
“historical price” models to prevent cyclical shifts in balance 
sheets. Rating agencies, on the other hand, have received so 
much criticism that, heated discussions are ongoing about 
disregarding their ratings all together from financial regulations.  
 
Another drastic move came from across the Atlantic. IMF, a 
champion of free markets, has discussed in a recent study that, 
capital controls are a “legitimate” tool in some cases for 
governments facing surges in investment that threaten to 
destabilize their economies. It is argued that capital controls on 
certain types of inflows might usefully complement prudential 
regulations to limit financial fragility and can be part of the 
toolkit.  
 
These shifts in opinions and perceptions, though radical, are 
not unprecedented. Looking at the responses of policy makers 
to the crisis, one can easily find quite few similarities between 
what is happening today and what happened in 1930s.  
 
As you may recall, the 1920s was the period of ever increasing 
liberalization and deregulation, but in the aftermath of Great 
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Depression it was replaced quite radically by capital controls, 
regulations, and trade barriers. The same pendulum swing from 
on extreme to another is happening today. In fact, it is quite 
fair to argue that uncoordinated, reactionary and self-interested 
measures proposed or undertaken by policy makers today carry 
the risk of repeating the past mistakes in the near future. 
 
In our efforts to rebuild a new system, we shouldn’t look for 
quick fixes. We need to recognize and then address the 
fundamental problems starting from conventional wisdom on 
human behavior. The concept of homo economicus is based on 
cost and benefit analysis performed quite rationally. The utility 
maximizing behavior implies that humans maximize the 
expected sum of net present value of the utility over time. 
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a fundamental 
problem in the overlapping generations model on which we 
build micro level optimization decisions. Let me go over its 
underlying principles one by one: 
 
1. Summation means the agent is able to recognize and 
assess all possible outcomes. 
2. The emphasis on expected utility assumes that the agent 
considers both the probability of an event and the 
consequent payoff/cost 
3. Net present value implies the agent discounts the future, 
and the discount factor is continuous.  
 6
 
The problem is, human nature violates all three principles; 
 
1. Humans are not capable of recognizing all possible 
alternatives, even if it is a finite number. That’s why they 
need abstractions – to shrink immensely complex real life 
situations into smaller and manageable abstract 
prototypes – in fact this is also what we do as economists. 
We recognize our own shortcomings and use abstracts for 
a better understanding of the real world but quite 
interestingly when it comes to individuals we assume that 
they are super humans. 
 
2. Human nature cannot comprehend the meaning of small 
probabilities even if the outcome is extreme. For example, 
the probability of having a car accident is on a given day is 
very small, may be one in a million. But the consequence 
is extreme, injury or even death. Thus, if you multiply a 
very small number with infinitely large cost (e.g. death), 
the expected cost should always outweigh the 
inconvenience of using seat belts. Then, why we need 
traffic regulations and heavy fines to motivate its use? 
Because it is extremely demanding for human beings to 
fully comprehend and deal with tail events. Insurance 
deals underwritten by AIG on credit defaults are another 
perfect example of ignoring realization of tail events. One 
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can put CDS contracts on US sovereign debt under the 
same category as well. 
 
3. Humans are focused on immediate costs and rewards. This 
is not simply the issue of having the appropriate discount 
factor calibrated to match the reality. If that were the 
case, we should have paid more attention to extreme 
events of the future regardless of how distant they are. 
The problem is many people not only discount but simply 
ignore extreme events of the future. In other words for 
many people discount factor is not continuous, but 
discrete. Discrete term preference may cause jumps in 
decision variables from one extreme to another. There is 
certainly more room for additional research in this area, 
especially for behavioral economists. 
 
Due to aforementioned vulnerabilities of our mind, we rely on 
simple abstracts, ignore tail events, and become overconfident 
(ignoring the cost of extreme failures). It is not that we do not 
take lessons from disasters or forget these lessons. The 
problem is we ignore these lessons because extreme events are 
not part of simple abstracts; they occur with very small 
probability and even if they are likely to happen, they would 
take place far in the future. That is why we need regulations, 
traffic police, social security system, financial regulators and of 
course central banks.  
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New Global Order and the Global Financial System 
 
Second pillar of this analysis is to try to comprehend the new 
global order and the global financial system in the upcoming 
period. Akin to Mundell’s impossible trinity theory, Dani Rodrik 
argued that democracy, national sovereignty and global 
economic integration are mutually incompatible1. We can 
combine any two of the three, but never have all three 
simultaneously and in full. The problems we face today may be 
seen as a manifestation of this conflict. Policy makers are quite 
willing to assume the benefits of globalization, but reluctant 
and sometimes quite hostile to give up their grip over national 
policies, in part fearing backlash from voters who insist on 
saying the final word in democratic societies. Although the 
resistance of all parties is understandable, the current global 
institutional framework, or lack thereof, in this age of 
globalization is unsustainable. We should either give up 
globalization or build new institutional and regulatory scheme of 
global scale.  
 
The main element of the new global financial architecture is the 
establishment of a global institution capable of a high degree of 
representation. G-20 different from G-8, represents two thirds 
of the world population and around 90 percent of world GDP 
including both advanced and emerging economies around the 
 9
globe. Unlike the Great Depression, such institutions were used 
extensively owing to the need for global coordination and 
cooperation. They have enabled joint effort on a global scale 
against the cross border institutions creating systemic risks and 
regulatory arbitrage originated in the off-shore banking hubs 
and tax havens. 
 
On the other hand, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
are standing before us as the building blocks of the new global 
financial architecture. These institutions have been assigned 
new roles and responsibilities while their resources were 
increased substantially. IMF is now responsible for setting up 
global surveillance systems as an addition to its existing duties. 
Beyond the country-based problems, IMF is now tracking the 
global macro imbalances. It is predicted that with its resources 
of more than 1 trillion US Dollar, IMF will take the role of global 
quasi central bank in the future if it can manage to establish an 
unconditional financial safety net. This will also alleviate the 
need for emerging economies to keep huge reserves as 
insurance and further feed the macro imbalances.   
 
In the process, the membership of the Financial Stability Board, 
which was established to develop and implement strong 
regulatory and supervisory policies, has been enlarged to 
consist of all the members of the G-20. Besides, a quota reform 
has been implemented to enhance the influence of the dynamic 
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under-represented emerging market countries in the IFIs. In 
the local scale, plans to assign Central Banks more active role 
in preventing the systemic risks and asset bubbles are being 
discussed.  
 
As of late, the work is under way for the regulations on the 
institutions classified as “too big to fail” or as they have 
recently been named SIFIs (systemically important financial 
institutions). These institutions are asked to pay extra costs 
considering the risks they pose against the system. They are 
even encouraged for divestiture. From the perspective of the 
global order, the current crisis has shown us that the large 
accumulation of influence in these companies have incurred 
irreparable problems to the system due to the lack of market 
control.   
 
As a result, the quest for a new global order continues both in 
theoretical and practical levels. The predictability, balance, 
permanence and sustainability of the new global order will 
depend on the cooperative and coordinated efforts to establish 
a well-represented infrastructure. Obviously the feasibility and 
the sustainability of a global order are the most challenging 
issues. Depending on the comparative evaluation of the 
previous successful and failed attempts in the history, we can 
derive core principles to describe a feasible and sustainable 
order. My personal observation and conclusion is that three 
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pillars which are necessary for the stability and the 
sustainability of such an order are freedom and democracy, 
equity and rule of law and universality and participation. 
 
The Role of Central Banks in the New Global Financial 
System 
 
Until recently when you asked the primary mandate of central 
banks, the typical response would be price stability. However, 
the history tells us that central banks were founded for quite 
different reasons in many countries. For instance the Bank of 
England was founded in the 17th century to cover the financing 
need of the British Government during its war against France. 
Likewise, Bank de France was created in the 19th century 
during the Napoleon Wars against the Great Britain. These 
institutions had the privilege of issuing banknotes in exchange 
for providing funds for treasuries. In other countries, providing 
stability in financial markets was the paramount concern. For 
example, the need for a lender of last resort following panics 
and crashes during the early 20th century led to creation of the 
Federal Reserve system in the US.  
 
The concept of price stability was not brought to the foreground 
during the initial stages of central banking, because there was 
not much concern for inflation in many advanced economies. 
The value of money was well-protected thanks to the use of 
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gold standard. As Friedman once said, “Inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Therefore, permanent 
inflation should not be a concern as long as long term money 
supply expands in parallel to long term money demand. In this 
context, inflation concerns were kept in the background in 
many countries under the gold standard during the 19th and 
most of the 20th century. With the collapse of gold standard in 
early 20th century and its successor (the Bretton Woods 
System) in 1973, we have entered the era of fiat money. In the 
absence of a solid anchor like gold, the only mechanism left 
behind to support the value of the fiat money was the 
credibility of central banks. This brought out the issue of price 
stability in the foreground of central banking.  
 
Our initial experience with fiat money was not promising. In the 
late 70s, many countries including advanced economies 
experienced rapid monetary expansion and as a result very 
high inflation rates, in many instances in double digits. 1981 
was the turning point of central banking. The Federal Reserve, 
under the leadership of its chairman Paul Volcker, engaged in a 
very tight and painful monetary tightening, despite the harsh 
criticism from the US administration and the real sector. As 
inflation rate in the US gradually declined to low single digits, 
the Federal Reserve earned the reputation of an 
uncompromised inflation fighter, which gradually extended to 
other central banks in advanced economies as well. This was 
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also the period in which many central banks gained operational 
independence. Over time it became a conventional wisdom 
among policy makers that the most important and long lasting 
contribution of central banks to long term growth and financial 
stability is to establish and sustain price stability. After the 
triumphant results monetary policy achieved during the “Great 
Moderation”, this unity of mandate has gone far beyond a 
policy tool to ensure the wealth and the prosperity of nations 
but it has become almost an ideological obsession. 
 
As the issue of financial stability has gained critical importance 
during the recent global crisis, central banks are asked to 
address directly not only price stability but also financial 
stability as well. As I explained before, to maintain smooth 
functioning of the financial system has been a concern of many 
central banks since their foundation. In fact, that is the reason 
we are called as "the bank of banks" or "the lender of last 
resort" for financial institutions. However, over time as the 
financial system get more complicated and expanded 
exponentially, its supervision and regulation has been partially 
transferred to other institutions, which is also the case in 
Turkey. 
 
The challenge faced by central banks is to establish a 
framework that combines both price stability and financial 
stability as primary mandates even at times they conflict with 
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each other and identify the policy instruments to target both. 
As you know central banks have typically used short-term 
interest rates as their primary policy instrument. However, the 
“Tinbergen Rule” suggests that this one instrument could be 
deployed to achieve only one target2, which is conventionally 
recognized as price stability. Addressing both price stability and 
financial stability simultaneously necessitates a second set of 
policy tools. This second instrument may be in the form of the 
regulation of financial activities. The question is that whether 
financial stability responsibility should be assumed solely by 
central banks. The downside of this option is that central banks 
may turn out to be too inflexible or in conflict with themselves, 
which eventually led to failure in both objectives. More 
importantly, central banks may lose their independence and get 
politicized. Make no mistake, politicization of a central bank 
might not necessarily stem from politicians. If it becomes the 
sole authority in financial regulation, the nature of new 
mandates would force central bank function in political sphere. 
Eventually the bank would find itself in a position that requires 
taking political stance. 
 
As discussed by Sargent and Wallace in “Some Unpleasant 
Monetarist Arithmetic”3, a permanently higher government 
deficit as in the case of unprecedented stimulus following the 
global crisis must eventually be accommodated by an increase 
in the monetary base. In this case, the choice which faces 
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central bank is not whether to monetize public sector deficit but 
when, sooner or later. In the long run according to unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic, the growth in money stock is governed 
by the fiscal deficit.  
 
Despite all the reservations regarding the effectiveness of 
monetary policy and arsenal that central banks have, in case of 
a financial crisis and a need to bail out financial institutions, 
central banks would intervene, regardless of their initial rhetoric 
that suggest otherwise. This was the case in UK as the sub 
prime mortgage problems emanating from the U.S. seriously 
impaired the financial sector. You may recall, when the 
Northern Rock Bank, one of the UK's largest mortgage lenders, 
faced problems due to its exposure to subprime CDO market, 
the initial declaration indicated that there would be no bail out. 
However, after a few days the Bank of England agreed to give 
emergency financial support to the Northern Rock to prevent 
cascading of bank failures. A similar episode also experienced in 
Europe. In order to address disruptions in markets and 
eliminate the substantial repercussions inside the Europe, ECB 
has intervened in Euro zone government bond markets and 
started bond purchases full of ambiguities, despite the previous 
statements from the Bank’s part. 
 
When we look at the difference between financial regulators like 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) in Turkey 
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and the central bank, we see that the main difference is the 
central bank’s capability of printing unlimited amount of money.  
Therefore, if central banks become the sole authority as 
financial watchdog, they definitely would face time 
inconsistency problem. In case of a financial meltdown, they 
would find themselves in an impossible situation. If they try to 
keep their promise to protect the value of money, they would 
fail in their role as financial regulator. If they use printing 
machine to bail out banks, they would not be able to protect 
the value of money they print. At the end even they protect de 
jure independence; they would de facto lose it. There is only 
one solution to this dilemma: to make sure that financial crisis 
never happens. Therefore, in order to protect their 
independence central banks would choose to over regulate, 
which would be a sub optimal decision itself.  
 
Is there an alternative? As a result of the developments of the 
past two years, the appropriate scope of central bank policy 
actions in a crisis is now a matter of significant public 
discussion, one that is taking place in the context of a wider 
debate over financial regulatory reform. Walter Bagehot's 
dictum effectively addresses key economic objectives of society 
and thus continues to provide a useful framework for the 
formulation of central banks' policy actions in a crisis4. We can 
summarize the Bagehot's dictum as follows: The central banks 
should extend credit to private sector in need (at punishing 
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rate) but never to public sector. Because, private sector would 
engage in productive activities and pay off the debt, 
governments do not. By lending freely, the central bank may be 
able to quell powerful panic-driven demands for liquidity and 
their potentially untoward effects on the economy. Providing a 
virtually unlimited source of liquidity to institutions can avert 
the fire sales that can lead to decreases in asset values, 
reductions in wealth, and ultimately to a costly contraction in 
economic activity. And providing liquidity can enable a 
continuation of the lending by financial institutions that is 
necessary to support activity at the economy's potential. We 
might call this the macroeconomic rationale for Bagehot's 
dictum--promoting the full employment of resources. 
 
The problem today as compared to 19th century is that 
financial institutions are no longer equity based institutions 
operating with small leverage (i.e. like typical banks in the 19th 
century). They are over leveraged, engaged in speculative 
transactions; the difference between deposit banks and 
investment banks is blurred. Therefore, according to Bagehot 
principles credit extended to banking sector is as unacceptable 
as extending credit to the government. As a central banker I 
fully support Paul Volcker, who is also a central banker, to 
protect central bank independence. Commercial banks would 
provide customers with depository services and access to 
credit. They would be highly regulated, but also benefit from 
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lender of last resort of facility of the central bank. Securities 
firms, on the other hand, would have the freedom to take on 
more risk and practice trading, be subject to less regulation and 
be regulated and supervised independent public agencies. Their 
clients, creditors and shareholders would know that they would 
fully assume the risk of their operations. To prevent moral 
hazard problem, these institutions would stay out of the central 
bank’s sphere, unless they have enough high quality collateral. 
And last but not the least, if we want the term “financial 
stability” not to turn into an oxymoron, let the financial activity 
be more of equity nature than a complex and continuous selling 
and reselling of the liabilities to such extend that at the end no 
one is able to figure out neither the real debtor, nor the debt 
itself. And we should always keep in mind that scope and field 
of application of the very first law of thermodynamics which 
says; “energy (read as risk) can be neither created nor 
destroyed. It can only change forms or place” is not limited to 
mechanical kind of engineering, but this reality holds true for 
the financial type of it, as well. 
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